Roba Pero Hace? An experimental test of the competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis in Spain and Sweden by Esaiasson, Peter & Muñoz, Jordi
  
 
 
 
ROBA PERO HACE? 
An experimental test of the competence-corruption tradeoff hy-
pothesis in Spain and Sweden 
 
 
Peter Esaiasson 
Jordi Muñoz 
 
 
  
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 2014:02 
 
QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG 
February 2014 
ISSN 1653-8919 
© 2014 by Peter Esaiasson and Jordi Muñoz. All rights reserved. 
 
 2 
Roba Pero Hace? – An experimental test of the competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis in 
Spain and Sweden 
Peter Esaiasson  
Jordi Muñoz 
QoG Working Paper Series 2014:02 
February 2014 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
From previous research it is known that one of the main mechanisms that limits the ability of elec-
tions to be effective in controlling corruption has to do with a sort of implicit exchange of trans-
parency for competence, as summarized by the Latin-American saying ‘roba pero hace’. However, 
we do not know how this mechanism travels across contexts, and especially whether it also oper-
ates in low corruption situations. In this paper we conduct a full factorial 2x2 survey-embedded 
experiment in which we manipulate ‘competence’ and ‘corruption’ of an incumbent mayoral candi-
date to estimate the effect of competence on the electoral cost of corruption. We replicate the ex-
periment in a context with low level of corruption (Sweden) and another one with a medium level 
of prevalence (Spain). Results show clear evidence of such an exchange in both national contexts, 
and point to a mechanism of dissonance reduction as one of its drivers.  
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 La Vall d’Alba is a small municipality in the Spanish autonomous community of Valencia. In 2007, 
the mayor Francisco Martínez was involved in an alleged corruption scandal. During his time in 
office, Martinez’ neighbours donated him 13 estate properties. Following a change in their qualifi-
cation from agricultural to residential or industrial soil, Martinez sold some of these properties for a 
large sum of money. In tandem, Martínez was using his position as vice president in the provincial 
government to attract investments to the municipality. Over a short period of years, a school, a 
high school, a medical centre, a chapel, an industrial area, an indoor swimming pool, a senior’s cen-
tre, a new police station, and even a bullfighting arena were built in the municipality of 3,000 inhab-
itants. In the ensuing election, Martinez and his party increased their electoral support, reaching an 
all-time high of 71 percent of the vote. 
 
As described here, the Martinez-case suggests an answer to the longstanding question why voters 
frequently forgive corrupt politicians: because they deliver public goods. In the scientific literature 
this answer is linked to the ‘competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis’, originally proposed by 
Rundquist and colleagues in the 1970’s (1977). Outside academia, it embodies the Latin American 
saying ‘roba pero hace’ (he steals but he delivers) often used to express voters’ preference for high-
performing but corrupt politicians.1 
 
The competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis has been examined in recent survey experimental 
research. Studying Brazil, a high corruption national context, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) 
failed to corroborate the hypothesis. In a carefully designed experiment they found little evidence 
that voters are willing to overlook corruption in exchange for public goods delivery when provided 
specific and accessible information about corrupt behaviour. Similarly, in a study comparing a low 
corruption country (Sweden) and a high corruption country (Moldova), Klasjna and Tucker (2013) 
found that voters in the former country punished corruption regardless of the state of the econo-
my. However, adding complexity to the picture, Moldovan voters were willing to support corrupt 
politicians when economic conditions were good.  
                                                     
1
 The corresponding expression in Portuguese, very popular in Brazil, is ‘rouba, mas faz’. 
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In this paper we report findings from further comparative survey experiments on the competence-
corruption tradeoff hypothesis. To help identify boundary conditions for voluntary corruption 
voting, we model our experiments on the Brazilian study but provide participants with less specific 
and accessible information about corrupt behaviour. While Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (as did Klas-
jna and Tucker) made corruption voting costly – for instance by using the normatively charged 
term “bribery” to describe politicians’ wrongdoings – we rely on a more neutrally worded descrip-
tion of corrupt behaviour. Moreover, to examine the extent to which voters’ sensitivity to corrup-
tion information varies between national contexts, we run the experiments in two OECD-
countries, the one with low level of corruption (Sweden), and the other with a medium level of 
prevalence (Spain). 
 
A further contribution of the paper is to explore a psychological mechanism that might lower the 
costs of corruption voting for the individual. According to the original tradeoff hypothesis (Rund-
quist et al. 1977), voters engage in a rational calculation of costs and gains. We argue that the im-
plicit trade between competence and corruption is facilitated by dissonance reduction as well 
(Festinger 1957; Aronson 1969; Stone 2000).  Precisely, we suggest that citizens reduce the psycho-
logical strain associated with voting for a corrupt but efficient politician by downplaying the severi-
ty of wrongdoing. 
 
In contrast to the Brazilian study and the previous study on the Swedish case, results support the 
competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis in both national contexts: when corruption voting is 
made less costly – for instance by describing wrongdoings in neutral terms – respondents prefer a 
corrupt but competent candidate over an honest but less competent one. Moreover, we find sup-
port for that corruption voting is facilitated by dissonance reduction: in both countries respondents 
judged the corruption case as less severe when the candidate was presented as competent for the 
office, and these severity judgments mediate the effects of politicians’ behaviour on the reported 
likelihood of voter support.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first two sections review the literature and devel-
op our theoretical arguments. Following brief descriptions of country context, the next section lays 
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out experimental design and measurements. We then move on to presenting our empirical results, 
before a final section concludes and discusses implications of our findings. 
 
Corruption voting in the literature 
According to democratic theory, elections are expected to work as a mechanism to hold incum-
bents accountable for their performance in office (see, for example, Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981). 
Being involved in corruption should bear severe punishment, given its widely recognized negative 
economic and social consequences (e.g. Mauro 1995; Nye 1967; Seligson 2002; Anderson & Tver-
dova 2003; Kumlin & Esaiasson 2012). If that were the case, democratic politics would be an effi-
cient tool for corruption control since corrupt incumbents would not be re-elected, and since elect-
ed officials would be discouraged of incurring in such practices out of fear of electoral punishment.  
 
However, the persistence of substantial levels of corruption in many democratic countries challeng-
es theoretical expectations. As noted by Kurer (2001, 63), unpopular corruption and popular cor-
rupt politicians is “a widely observed paradox”. Although corruption tends to bear an electoral cost 
for incumbents (Chong et al. 2011; Davis et al. 2004; McCann & Dominguez 1998), the cost is 
modest and does not preclude re-election. The pattern of modest punishment and high re-election 
rates is found in several national contexts: the U.S. (Peters & Welch 1980; Welch & Hibbing 1987), 
the UK (Eggers & Fisher 2011), Poland (Slomczynski & Shabad 2011), Japan (Reed 1999), Italy 
(Chang et al. 2010), Spain (Costas-Perez et al. 2012, Rivero & Fernandez-Vazquez 2011), and com-
paratively across European countries (Bågenholm 2013). 
 
How is that possible? If voters disdain corruption, why do they keep voting corrupt politicians into 
office? The literature suggests different reasons for why corruption often does not bear the ex-
pected electoral punishment. 
 
One prominent hypothesis has to do with information: only if sufficiently informed, voters will be 
able to incorporate the issue of corruption to their voting decision. In support of the information 
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hypothesis, Klasnja (2011) shows how political awareness significantly depresses the likelihood of 
voting for incumbents in the U.S. House and Senate elections following investigating actions from 
government authorities. Blais et al. (2005) showed, for Canada, how in the wake of a big corruption 
scandal uninformed voters were, on average, less likely to perceive high levels of corruption. Mov-
ing from individual level awareness to informational context, Chang et al. (2010) argue that the 
media had a key impact on the relatively high punishment rates in the 11th legislature in Italy. Ex-
ploiting randomized federal audits on Brazilian municipalities, Ferraz and Finan (2008) find signifi-
cant negative effects on the electoral fate of the incumbent mayors of the public disclosure of in-
formation on their corrupt activities, especially in those municipalities with local radio stations. 
Similarly, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) find that Brazilian voters are unwilling to support in-
cumbents when they are provided unequivocal and accessible information about wrongdoings. 
 
However, other studies are less supportive of the information hypothesis. In a lab experiment, de 
Figueiredo et al. (201o) finds that information enhances accountability by a modest three percent of 
the vote. Moreover, this happens only in some cases (when a left party is affected) and information 
about corruption also reduces electoral turnout. As discussed in the introduction, Klasjna and 
Tucker (2013) finds that Moldovan respondents in a survey experiment did not punish incumbents 
for taking bribes when economic conditions were good. Similarly, in a cross-national study 
Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) also find that the effect of corruption concerns on pres-
idential approval is conditional upon the state of the economy. Studying Mexican local elections, 
Chong et al. (2011) finds that information about corruption reduces incumbent vote, but also turn-
out. Thus, information alone does not guarantee accountability, as voters may respond by with-
drawing from the political process.  
 
Another explanation for corruption voting has to do with clientelism. Manzetti and Wilson (2007) 
argue that people vote for corrupt politicians where clientelism is widespread and institutions are 
weak, because they are able to secure the delivery of public goods by voting for the incumbent. 
Politicians maintain electoral support by manipulating government institutions to benefit their cli-
entelistic networks and, therefore, the support they can gather depends on the ability to distribute 
this patronage. In line with this reasoning, Chang and Kerr (2009) find evidence of higher corrup-
tion tolerance among ‘patronage insiders’ in the African context.  
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Overall, while relevant, the clientelism hypothesis has an obvious limit: it would only predict sup-
port for corrupt politicians when a clientelistic linkage between parties and voters prevails over 
programmatic or identity-based appeals, which does not seem to apply to many of the aforemen-
tioned cases, and certainly not to our cases of study. Indeed, even when targeting Greece – a most 
likely case in the European context – a survey experiment by Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) 
fail to corrobate that clientelism mitigates the electoral cost of corruption. 
 
However, exchange of support for benefits might operate in less direct ways than in clientelistic 
relationships. In an influential article, Rundquist et al. (1977) develop the idea of an ‘implicit’ trad-
ing that involves ideological values and issue positions that are relevant for the voter. According to 
their argument, a rational voter might knowingly support a corrupt candidate if the candidate is 
close to his or her political preferences on important political issues. Ideological proximity, there-
fore, might compensate for corruption among incumbents. Moreover, later research suggests that 
partisanship might function in a similar way as ideological proximity. Partisan links can be strong 
enough to compensate for the negative evaluation of corruption and to keep voters loyal to their 
parties (Anderson& Tverdova 2003; Davis et al. 2004;).  
 
The competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis 
The competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis follows the logic of the original tradeoff hypothe-
sis but focuses a different commodity. Rather than ideological proximity and shared partisanship, it 
emphasizes politicians’ competence for office as demonstrated in output performance. It is indeed 
the idea expressed by the Latin-American saying ‘roba pero hace’ discussed in the introduction.  
 
The hypothesis implies that perception of the incumbent as a competent politician who is able to 
attract investments and foster economic development to his/her constituency will limit the elec-
toral punishment for corruption. Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2013) report findings of this purport in 
a study on local Spanish elections. In corruption cases that could reasonably be described as ‘wel-
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fare enhancing’ (for example, because they imply an increased economic activity) incumbents where 
not punished at the polls, whereas cases in which corruption clearly decreased welfare led to sub-
stantial losses in the upcoming election. Correspondingly, in their survey experiment of Greek vot-
ers Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) finds that reducing council taxes increases support for a 
corrupt mayor by eight percentage points.  
  
As discussed above, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) test support for the competence-corruption 
tradeoff hypothesis in a survey experiment run in Brazil, a high corruption country and therefore a 
most likely context. Contrary to the hypothesis, they find no evidence of implicit trading among 
participants when they were provided specific and accessible information about an incumbent 
mayor’s wrongdoings (only the wealthiest participants showed some willingness to tolerate corrupt 
behaviour). It is clear from their study that voters under some conditions punish corrupt politicians.  
 
However, given the mixed findings in the literature a key question that follows from their study is 
to identify precisely what those conditions are: How should we reasonably model the boundaries in 
which voters willingly trade competence for corruption? Drawing on the literature on corruption 
voting we suggest here that the variables of interest includes the scale and nature of corrupt behav-
iour; specificity, credibility and accessibility of information about wrongdoings; expectations about 
politicians’ behaviour; the supply of alternative candidates; and the type of benefits delivered in 
return for voter support. Knowing how these (and other) variables jointly and independently affect 
the likelihood that voters will trade competence for corruption will generate a fuller understanding 
of voluntary corruption voting. 
 
In their study, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro informed participants that an incumbent mayor was 
known to frequently take bribes when giving out government contracts, presumably for personal 
gain. The type of benefits delivered in return for voter support – the demonstrated competence for 
office – was that the mayor had completed many public work projects during his term in office 
(Winters & Weitz-Shapiro 2013, 423).  Overall, the conditions described in the experiment make 
corruption voting costly: there is little doubt that allegations are substantiated, the wrongdoings are 
made for the sake of personal greed (Bauhr 2012) and are described using the normatively charged 
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term ‘bribery”, and the benefits offered in return for support are rather vague.  
 
To begin searching for boundary conditions, we study a situation in which corruption voting is less 
costly. For this purpose, the treatment in our experiment does not explicitly mention illegal acts 
such as bribery. Rather it describes a situation in which the incumbent mayor is accused for favour-
ing local developers that are closely connected to his party. If substantiated, these acts are clear 
examples of abuse of public office for private gain, but the treatment does not rely on terms that 
mention illegalities. Furthermore, we are referring to party-related illicit activities rather than to 
wrongdoings for personal gain. Moreover, the benefits delivered in return for support are plentiful; 
during the mayor’s term in office, public services’ performance has greatly improved, many public 
works have been completed, and the quality of life and economic prospects of the municipality has 
improved. 
To enhance generalizability of findings, we conduct our experiment in country contexts less fa-
vourable to corruption voting than Brazil – Sweden and Spain. As a low corruption country, Swe-
den can be classified as highly unfavourable for corruption voting. For instance, the likelihood of 
finding a clean alternative candidate is very high (Kurer 2001; Caselli & Morelli 2004). With regard 
to level of corruption, Spain falls between Sweden and Brazil, and the comparison between Sweden 
and Spain will thus help to assess the extent to which the corruption-competence tradeoff is con-
tingent upon country levels of corruption. 
 
Our interest in the tradeoff hypothesis extends to alternative causal mechanisms as well. In the 
previous literature a strict rational choice mechanism underlies the tradeoff: voters weigh several 
considerations when deciding how to vote; in this calculus competence and performance can out-
weigh negative evaluations related to corruption and result in a continued electoral support (cf. 
Rundquist et al. 1977). Conceived as a standard multiple criteria decision-making problem, it is 
straightforward to conclude that, depending on their evaluations and saliency attached to each con-
sideration, voters might end up voting corrupt but efficient or ideologically close candidates.  
 
While relevant, this might not be the full story. When voters are confronted with a corruption case 
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affecting an incumbent that is otherwise regarded as competent, they face a situation of cognitive 
dissonance. According to the classical theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger et al. 1956; Ar-
onson 1969) people prefer their cognitions to be compatible, and when dissonance arises there is a 
natural tendency to reduce it by adapting evaluations of the relevant object.  
 
Respondents exposed to a vignette about a candidate that is portrayed as corrupt but competent 
face a situation in which positive and negative information about the same object is presented sim-
ultaneously. According to cognitive dissonance theory, this might cause discomfort and lead them 
to adapt their evaluation of the pieces of information received to make them less dissonant. One 
way to dissonance reduction in the context of the ‘corrupt but competent’ candidate is to evaluate 
the misbehaviour less severely than in a case of a ‘corrupt and incompetent’ incumbent, which does 
not pose the same kind of dissonance problems and therefore can easily be judged more severely. 
This psychological mechanism has been shown to apply for corruption and partisanship (Anduiza 
et al.2014; cf. Gonzales et al. 1995), and in this paper we explore whether it is also the case for cor-
ruption and competence. 
 
From the discussion above we derive a set of hypotheses for empirical evaluation. To evaluate sup-
port for the competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis we specify two testable propositions: 
H1a: Incompetence has a stronger negative effect on voter support than corruption (a candidate 
perceived as honest but incompetent will gather less support than a corrupt but competent one).  
H1b: Competence will dampen the negative effect of corruption on voter support. 
  
To test for the presence of dissonance reduction we specify the following proposition:  
H2a: A given corruption allegation will be judged more severely when the candidate is perceived as 
incompetent than when he/she is perceived as competent. Furthermore, in the presence of corrup-
tion, severity judgments will mediate the effect of competence on voter support.  
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Country context: corruption and voting in Spain and Sweden  
According to standard indicators, Spain is a mid-corruption country. It ranks 30th in the Transpar-
ency International 2012 CPI index, right below Cyprus and Botswana, and right above Estonia. In 
contrast, Sweden is ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the world.  
 
Illustrating contextual differences, several waves of corruption scandals have affected the major 
Spanish parties since the restoration of democracy in 1978. During the roughly ten years of housing 
bubble from the late 1990’s to the late 2000’s, many local scandals erupted in Spain, most of which 
were linked to the construction industry. Bribe payments to local authorities in exchange for per-
mission to develop housing projects in non-residential soil were probably the most common pat-
tern of corrupt practices in those years (Jiménez 2009). Illegal funding of political parties linked to 
all sorts of public tenders is also a major source of scandals in the Spanish democracy, and has af-
fected with more or less intensity a majority of the incumbent parties at the national and subnation-
al levels. More traditional cases of misappropriation of public funds or nepotism in the allocation of 
public jobs are also relatively common.  
 
While Sweden enjoys the reputation of being low in corruption, scandals involving waste of public 
funding have occurred regularly in the country during the past decades, most often in local politics. 
Moreover, several recent scandals involving local and national bureaucracies have made corruption 
a more salient issue among the general public. Furthermore, compared to Scandinavian neighbour 
countries, Swedish citizens perceive that the level of corruption is relatively widespread among 
public officials (Linde & Erlingsson 2013).  
 
With regard to corruption voting, common wisdom in Spain states that corruption is often not 
punished at the polls. This commonly held view is supported by frequent examples of incumbents 
getting re-elected despite being under investigation after corruption allegations. Indeed, systematic 
evidence points to a lack of punishment (Rivero & Fernández 2010) or, at best, to a modest 4 per-
cent loss of mayors involved in corruption (Costas-Pérez et al. 2012). Reflecting a lagging scholarly 
interest, corresponding systematic information is lacking for Sweden. However, casual observations 
 12 
suggest that local parties whose leadership have been involved in spending scandals may lose sub-
stantial electoral support. In line with this expectation, Klasnja and Tucker (2013) found that Swe-
dish voters were highly intolerant of corrupt behaviour.  
 
Experimental design and measurements 
We have conducted identical population based survey-experiments in Spain and Sweden. In a 2x2 
full factorial design, respondents were presented with a brief vignette describing a mayor belonging 
to their preferred party (or bloc of parties in the Swedish case). The mayor was described as (1) 
having a good (or bad) management records, and (2) being accused of giving contracts to develop-
ers with close connections to the party (or being generally regarded as very honest).  The design 
mirrors Winters and Weitz-Shapiro’s (2013) experiment in Brazil although with a simpler setup: our 
2x2 factorial design matches respondents’ preferred party with the party of the mayor. 
 
Matching the party of the mayor with respondents’ partisanship increases the realism of the deci-
sion: if the mayor belongs to an outparty (or an outparty block), punishment becomes costless and 
we could severely overestimate it. Moreover, matching increases precision since we gain full control 
of a major characteristic of the politician that has been shown to matter for punishment of wrong-
doings. 
 
Before reading the vignette, respondents were prompted to think of a friend with similar political 
views as themselves and who is living in a town similar to theirs. The third-person strategy is in-
tended to reduce social desirability biases. Table 1 presents the four vignettes.  
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TABLE 1: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND VIGNETTES  
 Honest (H)  Corrupt (C) 
Competent (C) A MAYOR [FROM PARTY X], REGARDED AS VERY 
HONEST AND WELL-KNOWN FOR A GOOD MAN-
AGEMENT RECORD 
The mayor of that city, belonging to the party XXX, is 
regarded as a very honest politician, and is also well 
known for an impressive management record. During 
his terms in office, public services’ performance 
greatly improved and many public works were com-
pleted improving the quality of life and economic 
prospects of the municipality 
A MAYOR [FROM PARTY X], WELL-KNOWN FOR 
A GOOD MANAGEMENT RECORD, ACCUSED OF 
GIVING CONTRACTS TO DEVELOPERS CLOSE 
TO HIS PARTY 
The mayor of that city, belonging to the party XXX, 
has been accused of giving contracts to developers 
with close connections to the party, but is also well 
known for an impressive management record. During 
his terms in office, public services’ performance 
greatly improved and many public works were com-
pleted improving the quality of life and economic 
prospects of the municipality 
Incompetent (I) A MAYOR [FROM PARTY X], REGARDED AS VERY 
HONEST BUT WELL-KNOWN FOR A POOR MAN-
AGEMENT RECORD  
The mayor of that city, belonging to the party XXX, is 
regarded as a very honest politician, but is also well 
known for poor management record. During his terms 
in office, public services’ performance greatly wors-
ened and very few public works were completed, so 
the quality of life and economic prospects of the 
municipality did not improve 
A MAYOR [FROM PARTY X], WELL-KNOWN FOR 
A POOR MANAGEMENT RECORD, ACCUSED OF 
GIVING CONTRACTS TO DEVELOPERS CLOSE 
TO HIS PARTY 
The mayor of that city, belonging to the party XXX, 
has been accused of giving contracts to developers 
with close connections to the party, and is also well 
known for a poor management record. During his 
terms in office, public services’ performance greatly 
worsened and very few public works were completed, 
so the quality of life and economic prospects of the 
municipality did not improve 
 
After being exposed to the vignette, we asked whether respondents thought that their close friend 
would vote for such a mayor in the next election, and they were instructed to rate the probability 
on a 0-10 scale. This is the main outcome variable of the experiment.2 Moreover, to capture disso-
nance reduction we probed participants about the perceived severity of the practices described in 
the ‘corrupt’ conditions (responses were recorded on a corresponding 0-10 scale). We refer to the 
Appendix for precise question wordings for this and other key indicators.  
 
We can now derive observable implications of our three research hypotheses. H1a about the 
tradeoff hypothesis is corroborated if support of the competent but corrupt candidate (CC) is high-
er than support of the incompetent but honest candidate (IH): CC>IH. H1b about the dampening 
effect of competence on corruption voting is corroborated if the corruption effect on support is 
weaker when competence is high: (CH-CC)<(IH-IC). H2 about dissonance reduction is corroborat-
                                                     
2
 Following this, respondents were asked how likely they were themselves to vote for the candidate. The two indicators 
yield almost identical results. 
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ed if the alleged corrupt practice is judged more severely in the IC situation than in the CC condi-
tion, and if severity judgments mediate the effect of competence on support.  
 
Data collection 
Data from Spain are from an online survey conducted by the commercial firm Netquest on com-
mission (n = 973). The sample is selected from an on-line pool of respondents. Respondents are 
recruited among the registered users of the main, most massive commercial websites. Only those 
citizens that receive an invitation from the polling company can join the respondents’ pool. Thus, 
self-registering is not allowed, so the problems of self-selection are more limited. The sample was 
designed using gender, age, education and size of habitat quotas: while it is not a probability sample 
of the population, this sampling procedure provides variety in key demographics that minimize the 
risk of the results being driven by heterogeneous effects of the stimuli on a specific group of the 
population.  
 
The data for the Swedish case was collected by the Laboratory of Opinion Research at University 
of Gothenburg (LORE) as part of a continuous series of population based survey experiments 
(study n = 2,468). The sample in this seventh round of the “Swedish Citizen Panel” is self-selected 
but diverse (Martinsson et al. 2013). While, predictably, younger, male, educated and politically 
interested respondents are over-represented, the sample is sufficiently diverse for our purposes, and 
as part of a university run standing panel its quality is systematically monitored (e.g., Dahlberg et al. 
2012).3 
 
Results 
Figure 1 and Table 2 presents the main results of the experiment in respective national context. As 
expected if respondents interpret the treatment as intended, support for the candidate who is both 
competent and honest is high in both studies. Using a 0-10 scale, the likelihood that a close friend 
will support the competent and honest candidate is 7.8 in Spain and 8.2 in Sweden. Equally ex-
pected, support for the preferred party’s candidate who is neither competent nor honest is low in 
both country context (1,6 in Spain and 2,9 in Sweden). However, the main analytical interest is with 
the relative support for the ambivalent candidate who has one of the two coveted characteristics.   
                                                     
3
 Klasnja and Tucker (2013) rely on data from a previous wave of LORE’s citizen panel. 
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Different from the Brazilian comparison study, both experiments register a preference for a corrupt 
but competent mayoral candidate over an honest but incompetent candidate (CC>IH). In the 
Spanish study, the average reported likelihood for supporting the competent but corrupt incumbent 
(CC) is 4,9 as compared to 3,3 for the incompetent but honest candidate (IH). The difference of 1,6 
units reaches well beyond the confidence intervals. In the Swedish study the difference between CC 
and IH is smaller (0,5 units) but still statistically significant at the .05-level  (the likelihood to sup-
port respective type of incumbent mayoral candidate was 5,1 and 4,6). These results provide sup-
port for H1a.  
 
FIGURE 1: PROBABILITY OF CLOSE FRIEND VOTING FOR INCUMBENT MAYOR IN 
TWO NATIONAL CONTEXTS 
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TABLE 2: PROBABILITY OF CLOSE FRIEND VOTING FOR INCUMBENT MAYOR ACROSS 
TREATMENT GROUPS (MAIN STATISTICS)  
  Spain Sweden 
Competent/Honest (CH) Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
7,8                               (0,14)                               
249 
8,2                                   (0,07)                                             
615 
Competent/Corrupt (CC) Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
4,9                              (0,20)                             
225 
5,1                                      (0,10)                                              
631 
Incompetent/Honest (IH) Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
3,3                               (0,14)                              
247 
4,6                                              (0,10)                                             
615 
Incompetent/Corrupt (IC) Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
1,6                               (0,14)                              
252 
2,9                                              (0,06)                                            
607 
Total Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
4,4                               (0,11)                              
973 
5,2                                    (0,06)                                          
2,468 
Anova/F-test F/p 310,2 (p<0,001) 605,5 (p<0,001) 
 
Variance analysis offers another way to estimate support for the tradeoff hypothesis. Within this 
framework, the primary prediction that follows from H1a is that both competence and corruption 
will affect probability of voting for the incumbent mayor (in other words, the corruption effect will 
not dwarf the competence effect). Results clearly concur with this prediction. For Spain, a two-way 
ANOVA yields statistically significant and substantially strong main effects of both corruption (F(1, 
969)=228, p<0.01, partial η2 =0.19) and competence (F(1, 969)=661, p<0.01, partial η2=0.40). A 
similar set of results emerges in Sweden, with the main effect of corruption (F(1, 2464)=724, 
p<0.01, partial η2 =0.23) being similar and that of competence (F(1, 2464)=1046, p<0.01, partial 
η2 =0.30) weaker than in Spain. Thus, there is strong support for the competence-corruption 
tradeoff hypothesis in both national contexts. 
 
Turning to H1b and the expectation that corruption will matter less for voters when the candidate 
is competent for the office, results come out differently. As expected, there is a statistically signifi-
cant interaction between corruption and competence in both country contexts (in Spain, F(1, 
969)=15, p<0.01, partial η2=0.015; in Sweden, F(1, 2464)=59, p<0.01, partial η2 =0.02). However, 
the interaction effect is substantially weak and run in the opposite direction than hypothesized: 
corruption is somewhat more costly for competent candidates than for incompetent candidates, 
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that is (CH-CC)>(IH-IC). Thus, rather than dampening the support undermining effect of corrup-
tion for competent candidates, competence somewhat amplifies the effect.  
 
Given the strong competence effect in both country contexts, it appears that a floor effect is driv-
ing this result. In those treatment conditions representing the incumbent as incompetent, the rec-
orded probability of support is really low, so it can hardly fall beyond a certain point. This is espe-
cially so considering that the mayors’ partisanship was matched with that of the respondent.  
 
Causal mechanism: dissonance reduction 
The first step in our evaluation of H2 about dissonance reduction is to explore whether alleged 
wrongdoings are judged as less severe in the competence condition than in the incompetence con-
dition. Figure 2 and Table 3 presents key statistics.  
FIGURE 2: ASSESSED SEVERITY OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN TWO NATIONAL CON-
TEXTS 
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TABLE 3: ASSESSED SEVERITY OF CORRUPT PRACTICE (KEY STATISTICS) 
 
  Spain Sweden 
Competent/Corrupt (CC) Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
7,4                             (0,19)                              
225 
7,9                                            
(0,10)                                              
632 
Incompetent/Corrupt (IC) Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
8,7                             (0,14)                              
252 
8,6                                           
(0,08)                                            
609 
Total Mean         Std. 
Error     n 
8,1                              (0,12)                              
477 
8,2                                            
(0,06)                                          
1,241 
Anova/T-test F/t -5,72 (p<0,001) 33,4 (p<0,001) 
 
In accordance with theoretical expectations, this pattern is found in both national contexts. Using a 
0-10 scale, the practice of giving contracts to developers close to the party is graded as a more se-
vere wrongdoing in the incompetence conditions (8,7 in Spain and 8,6 in Sweden) than in the com-
petence conditions (7,4 in Spain and 7,9 in Sweden). Both differences are statistically significant at 
the .001-level. Further supporting H2, dissonance reduction is stronger in the Spanish study, which 
shows the largest advantage for the competent but corrupt mayoral candidate over the incompetent 
but honest mayoral candidate.  
 
Having established that the treatment (competence) does affect the proposed mediator (severity 
judgment), the remaining question is whether the mediator links the treatment to the relevant out-
come (probability of voting for the incumbent mayor). For an empirical test, we estimate the aver-
age causal mediation effect (ACME) using the procedure suggested by Imai et al. (2011). The pro-
cedure decomposes the treatment effect in two components: the direct effect and the mediated 
effect.4  
                                                     
4
 However, in this case, since both the outcome and the mediator are 0-10 scales treated as continuous variables, the 
result is equivalent to the so-called product of coefficients method based on estimating the effect of the treatment with 
and without the mediation in the model and taking the difference between both coefficients or, alternatively, multiplying 
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A key assumption for estimation of ACME is ‘sequential ignorability’, which means that there are 
no unaccounted confounders affecting both the mediator and the outcome. To get closer to this 
requirement, the estimation model includes a vector of controls that might be affecting both the 
mediator and the outcome: political knowledge; political trust; internal political efficacy; partisan-
ship strength; education; size of habitat; gender; and age. Table 3 reports key statistics.5  
 
TABLE 4: CAUSAL MEDIATION EFFECT OF PERCEPTION OF SEVERITY 
 
 
Spain Sweden 
Effect 
Mean [95 percent CI] Mean [95 percent CI] 
ACME 
-0,34 -0,53 -0,20 -0,31 -0,43 -0,20 
Direct Effect 
-3,03 -3,48 -2,56 -1,92 -2,17 -1,66 
Total Effect 
-3,37 -3,81 -2,90 -2,23 -2,51 -1,95 
Prop. of total effect mediated 
0,10 0,09 0,12 0,14 0,12 0,16 
 
Looking first at the Spanish case, the mediation effect of dissonance reduction, as estimated by 
variations in severity judgment across competent and incompetent corrupt incumbents, is about -
0,34, which equals to about 10 percent of the total effect of the treatment. In the Swedish case, the 
direct effect is smaller and therefore the mediation effect of severity judgment (-0,31) accounts for 
14 percent of the total effect of the treatment.  
 
Overall, thus, the mediation test comes out in support of H2. There is evidence that voters lower 
the psychological cost of voluntary corruption voting by mitigating the importance of wrongdoings 
when the candidate is regarded as competent for the office. However, as the dissonance reduction 
                                                                                                                                                           
the effect of the treatment on the mediator by the effect of the mediator on the outcome net of the direct effect of the 
treatment (Imai et al. 2011: 773).  
5
 As proposed by Imai et al. (2011) we have performed a complementary sensitivity analysis to see to what extent the 
estimated mediation effect is robust to violation of the sequential ignorability assumption. Results of the sensitivity anal-
ysis indicate that, for the ACME to be zero, the unobserved confounders should make the correlation between the error 
term of the mediator and the outcome models smaller than -0,26 in the case of Spain and -0,38 in Sweden. 
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explains only a limited portion of the competence effect, it should be emphasized that psychology 
matters to a degree only. In accordance with the original tradeoff hypothesis, results suggest that 
the trading of competence for honesty first and foremost is driven by a rational calculation.  
 
Conclusions and discussion 
This paper demonstrates that under some conditions voters in OECD countries are willing to sup-
port candidates from their own preferred party who are corrupt but otherwise competent for of-
fice. In accordance with the competence-corruption tradeoff hypothesis, survey experiments in 
Sweden (a low corruption national context) and Spain (a medium level corruption national context) 
document that participants prefer a corrupt candidate with a successful term in office over a clean 
but unsuccessful candidate. Moreover, the paper shows that voluntary corruption voting is facilitat-
ed by dissonance reduction; voters lower the psychological costs of supporting a morally question-
able candidate with a proven capacity for performance by mitigating the perceived severity of  
his/her wrongdoings. However, we also find that psychological dissonance reduction accounts for 
a relatively small portion of variations in corruption voting, which suggests that trading is primarily 
driven by rational calculations (Rundquist et al. 1977).  
 
These findings contrasts with those from our primary comparison study on Brazil (a high corrup-
tion national context). In a similarly designed survey experiment, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) 
found that Brazilian voters – especially those in the lower classes – reacted strongly against corrup-
tion and did prefer a poorly performing but honest mayoral candidate over a competent but cor-
rupt one. Likewise, a previous survey experiment on Sweden detected a strong willingness among 
voters to punish corrupt politicians even under good economic conditions (Klasjna& Tucker 2013).  
 
The unexpected finding that Brazilian voters punish corruption whereas Swedish and Spanish vot-
ers do not, raises the question of boundary conditions for voluntary corruption voting. What fac-
tors lowered the cost of corruption voting in our experiment to a level where participants were 
willing to trade competence for corruption among their preferred party’s incumbent mayoral candi-
dates? Although sharing basic design features, our experimental treatments differ from the Winters 
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and Weitz-Shapiro experiment with regard to information about wrongdoings of politicians, and to 
the type of benefit offered in return for voter support. Regarding wrongdoings, our treatment does 
not explicitly mention illegalities, and it refers to party-related illicit activities rather than to activities 
undertaken for the personal gain of the candidate. Regarding the type of benefit provided by the 
candidate, the treatment mentions not only completed public work projects (as did the Brazilian 
study), but also improved public services, and economically prosperous times. Clearly, while the 
country-contexts in our study are generally less conducive for the corruption-competence tradeoff 
hypothesis than is Brazil, these treatment variables manage to substantially reduce the costs of cor-
ruption voting.  
 
Given the widely recognized detrimental effects of corruption, it stands out as an important analyti-
cal challenge to systematically identify the conditions under which voters are, and are not, willing to 
support wrongdoing candidates from their own preferred party. Knowing the precise condition 
under which voters voluntarily trade competence for corruption will help to make the accountabil-
ity mechanisms of electoral democracy more effective. Our study suggests that type of wrongdoing, 
type of competent performance, and the use of emotionally charged terms like bribery are part of 
the picture. Other important factors highlighted in the corruption voting literature include expecta-
tions about politicians’ behaviour and the supply of alternative candidates (Kurer 2001; Caselli & 
Morelli 2004; Bågenholm 2011).  
 
Population-based survey experiments can contribute to a better understanding of the factors that 
condition voluntary corruption voting. A fruitful way forward would be to conduct a series of stud-
ies that follows a standardized design, that makes incremental changes in treatments, and that are 
run in several different country contexts. There are many practical obstacles to a concerted scholar-
ly effort of this kind, but there is also much to gain.   
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APPENDIX: question wording 
Third-person prompt:  
Now think about a friend of yours, with your same political ideas who lives in a city or town like 
yours.  
Dependent Variables: 
In your opinion, how likely is it that your friend would vote for such a mayor in the next 
election?  
He/she would not vote for such a 
mayor under any circumstance 
I am sure he/she would vote for such 
a mayor 
                                                                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
And what would you personally do? How likely is it that you would vote for such a mayor in 
the next election?  
I would not vote for such a mayor un-
der any circumstance 
I am sure I would vote for such a 
mayor 
                                                                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
And how serious do you think the practice of giving contracts to developers with close 
connections with the mayor’s party is?   Filter: only administered to treatments “Competent/Corrupt” 
and “Incompetent/Corrupt”.  
 
I do not think this is serious 
at all 
I think this is extremely serious 
                                                                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
